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Introduction 
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and 
Pentagon (9/11), the U.S. government declared that it would take the lead in waging 
a new “Global War on Terrorism” (GWOT). The official policy guiding this war, 
widely known as the “Bush Doctrine,” announced that no distinction would be 
made between terrorists and the “rogue states” that sponsor or harbor them.1 Hence, 
a new form of world war has commenced which seeks not only to interdict the 
activities of transnational sub-state terrorist networks, but also to conquer and 
reconstruct at least some of the terrorist-affiliated states that the U.S. has designated 
as belonging to an “Axis of Evil.”2 The wars that have since ensued in the name of 
counter-terrorism and humanitarian/democratic regime change have ignited an 
explosion of interest in just war theory (JWT). The purpose of this essay is to 
describe the patterns of JWT that have unfolded in the nascent post-9/11 era, and to 
assess how well just war theorists have so far addressed the issues raised by new 
modalities of counter-terrorism warfare. By focusing on a GWOT that hinges upon 
American power, and by drawing largely upon Anglo-American theoretical 
discourse, I shall be neglecting numerous questions and various modes of just war 
thinking that are of singular importance in other contexts. In particular, I shall 
neglect, as much of the recent literature has largely neglected, the special ways in 
which issues of just cause and right authority tend to play out in all-too-numerous 
domestic civil war contexts. Also, by addressing the notion of humanitarian 
intervention only from a counter-terrorism tangent, I shall neglect much of the full 
breadth and complexity of related issues. But a narrower focus on modes of JWT 
                                                
1 White House, National Security Strategy, September 2002, p. 5. Downloadable as of 6/6/07 from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. 
2 U.S. President George W. Bush, White House, “State of the Union Address,” January 29, 2002. 
Downloadable as of 6/6/07 from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html  
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that have arisen in direct response to 9/11, however limiting, may at least have the 
advantage of shedding some light on a constellation of related problems, which, if 
not truly hegemonic, at least currently occupies global center stage. 
     Just war theorists have traditionally concerned themselves with questions about 
ethical grounds for going to war in the first place (jus ad bellum), questions about 
ethical conduct in the course of battle (jus in bello), and questions about the ethics 
of post-conflict settlements (jus post bellum). I shall focus here on the first class of 
questions, paying special attention to how jus ad bellum principles of just cause, 
discrimination, necessity and proportionality apply to the very idea of a just GWOT, 
and to the kinds of interstate wars that have recently been heralded as worthy of this 
mantle. Although I shall offer my own dovish critical comments along the way, my 
primary aim is not so much to provide decisive answers as to give adequate 
formulations of the salient questions and to point out neglected areas of theoretical 
discussion.  
     A few words about the general nature of the discourse of JWT are warranted at 
the outset in order to warn against certain standard simplifications, and in order to 
atone in advance for the heuristic simplifications that I shall introduce here. Broadly 
conceived, JWT is not a firmly established set of conventional criteria that can be 
applied mechanically to every conceivable instance of armed conflict. As Jean 
Bethke Elshtain has recently noted, “the just war tradition does not present a series 
of boxes to check, and, should you get more than a given number, then war it is.”3 
Instead, JWT is the discursive practice of systematic public reflection and argument 
about how best to distinguish between ethically justifiable and unjustifiable 
warfare.4 In this broad sense, it includes a wide array of approaches to the ethics of 
war and peace, ranging from contingent pacifism to self-righteous militarism.5 The 
familiar principles of JWT are double-edged swords or, ideally, the common 
materials of many and varied conceptual plowshares. These principles are not 
names for timeless truths first discovered by moral or spiritual founding fathers. 
Instead, they are elements of a persistently contestable and evolving shared 
vocabulary of ethical justification and restraint. There is no monolithic just war 
                                                
3 Jean Bethke Elshtain, “Jean Bethke Elshtain Responds,” Dissent, Summer 2006.  
4 For a presentation and defence of this definition of just war theory, along with many samples of the 
varieties of work in the field that give evidence of the appropriateness of this broad definition, see 
http://www.JustWarTheory.com/.  
5 For a recent account of Hugo Grotius’ The Laws of War and Peace (1625) as presenting a just war 
theory that is tantamount to pacifism under most circumstances, see Larry May, “Grotius and Contingent 
Pacifism,” Studies in the History of Ethics, February 2006. Downloadable as of 6/6/07 from 
http://www.historyofethics.org/022006/022006May.html. 
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tradition, but at best competing traditions of just war theorizing.6 Every age from 
which recorded examples have been preserved has yielded distinctive patterns of 
just war thinking and as many different theories as original theorists. The best 
examples are those we judge by our own lights to offer the most important insights 
into how the use of arms might be restrained, made more humane, and ultimately 
directed towards the aim of establishing lasting peace and justice.  
 
1. Conventional and Revisionist Jus ad Bellum Principles  
It will be helpful in analyzing the theoretical ramifications of 9/11 and the ensuing 
GWOT to bear in mind a heuristic distinction between two types of JWT. 
Conventional expository JWT works within the ambit of a Westphalian 
understanding of public international law in an effort to reveal the principles that 
constitute its internal morality.7 Accordingly, conventionalists embrace principles of 
strong sovereign immunity from foreign aggression and intervention. And they 
conceive of just wars as wars of self-defense that are waged for the cause of 
resisting international aggression. Punishment of an aggressor once it has been 
repulsed is sometimes added as a purely derivative auxiliary just cause.8 Other 
subsidiary just causes for warfare – such as adjuvant defense on behalf of others 
who are resisting foreign aggression, invited counter-intervention in foreign civil 
wars, and possibly, but more contentiously, preemptive self-defense against 
imminent aggression9  – are to be understood as legitimate exceptions that are 
                                                
6 Rather than attempting to state what JWT is, David Rodin argues in War and Self-Defense (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2002, p. 103) that “it is more accurate to talk of the ‘just war tradition’ . . . for it 
includes a large number of diverse yet related positions.” To my mind, it would be even better to talk of 
competing traditions. For one central cleavage in the “tradition,” see Anthony Coates, “Humanitarian 
Intervention: A Conflict of Traditions,” Humanitarian Intervention: Nomos XLVII, Terry Nardin and 
Melissa S. Williams eds. (New York: New York University Press, 2006), pp. 58-83. In contrast, Terry 
Nardin sees “much internal agreement” in just war theory, but only in comparison with the relatively 
high degree of disagreement among theorists in the younger field of global or international distributive 
justice. See Nardin, “International Political Theory and the Question of Justice,” International Affairs, 
Volume 82, Number 3, 2006, pp. 454-455.    
7 Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 3rd ed. (New 
York: Basic Books, 2000) is easily the most influential version of a largely conventional just war theory. 
The features outlined here are characteristic of his “legalist paradigm.” It is a testament to Walzer’s 
influence that his views are so often taken to stand for what is conventional in JWT. For example, see 
Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, “The Preventive Use of Force: A Cosmopolitan Institutional 
Proposal,” Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 18, Number 1, 2004, pp. 1–22; & Jeff McMahan, 
“Just Cause for War,” Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 19, Number 3, Fall 2005(a), p. 1. Many 
systematic treatments of JWT do not fall neatly into either side of the heuristic distinction that I am 
employing here. For example, in The Morality of War (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2006), Brian 
Orend presents his version of JWT as both a means of explaining public international law (p. 33) and a 
means of justifying many exceptions to it (pp. 68-101).  
8 Walzer (2000), op. cit., pp. 62-63. 
9 It is worth noting here that the legality of the supposed right of states to preempt imminent aggression is 
highly controversial. See Michael Byers, “Preemptive Self-defense: Hegemony, Equality and Strategies 
of Legal Change,” The Journal of Political Philosophy, Volume 11, Number 2, 2003, pp. 171-190. Many 
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ultimately grounded in a global legal order of non-aggression among sovereign 
states. In contrast, unconventional critical JWT is revisionist in relation to the 
Westphalian paradigm of public international law,10 and sometimes exceptionalist in 
championing the prerogatives of just warriors unilaterally to flout prevailing legal 
principles.11 Revisionists seek to expand just causes for the deployment of military 
forces beyond mere self-defense against ongoing or imminent attacks to include (1) 
a humanitarian right to override conventional immunities of state sovereignty in 
order to provide armed protection for innocents abroad against certain grave 
harms,12 and/or (2) a right to wage preventive wars against the (less than imminent) 
threat that “rogue states” might equip sub-state terrorist organizations with weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD).13 Moreover, since rogue states not only export 
terrorism, but they also oppress and brutalized their own citizens, some revisionists 
would combine (1) & (2) in the construction of (3) a liberal cosmopolitan right to 
engage in interstate wars of forced democratic regime change.14  
     The principle of just cause is prior to other jus ad bellum considerations in the 
sense that a war cannot be, or is exceedingly unlikely to be discriminating, 
                                                                                                              
suppose that customary international law gives states the right to resort to arms preemptively on the basis 
of “a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, no moment for 
deliberation.” Yet, the details of the Caroline incident on which this standard is based reveal that it sets a 
standard for repelling particular threats, but not for commencing war against the state from which these 
threats originate. This standard leaves open the possibility of withdrawal and apology on the part of the 
threatening state before a condition of outright war is reached.   
10 Jeff McMahan, “The Ethics of Killing in War,” Ethics, Volume 114, July 2004, pp. 693-733; & Allen 
Buchanan, “Institutionalizing the Just War,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Volume 34, Number 1, 2006, 
pp. 2-38. 
11 McMahan (2004), op. cit.; & Jean Bethke Elshtain’s Just War Against Terror: The Burden of 
American Power in a Violent World (New York: Basic Books, 2004).  
12 Terry Nardin, “On The Moral Basis of Humanitarian Intervention,” Anthony F. Lang ed., Just 
Intervention (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2003), pp. 11-27; Kok-Chor Tan, “The 
Duty to Protect,” Terry Nardin and Melissa S. Williams eds., Humanitarian Intervention, NOMOS 
XLVII, NYU Press, 2005, pp. 84-116; Carla Bagnoli, “Humanitarian Intervention as a Perfect Duty: A 
Kantian Argument,” Nardin & Williams eds., op. cit., pp. 117-140; & Gillian Brock, “Humanitarian 
Intervention: Closing the Gap Between Theory and Practice,” Journal of Applied Philosophy, Volume 
23, Number 3, 2006, pp. 277-91. Brock argues that “the responsibility to protect” and the corresponding 
right of humanitarian intervention are conventional elements of public international law. Most theorists, 
however, see this as an emergent norm of a conventional legal order that is currently undergoing 
revision. Hence, I associate this kind of just cause with revisionist JWT.  
13 Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2004); Eric Patterson, “Just War in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Just War 
Theory after September 11,” International Politics, Volume 42, 2005, pp. 122–123 & 127; & Whitley 
Kaufman, “What’s Wrong with Preventive War? The Moral and Legal Basis for the Preventive Use of 
Force,” Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 19, Number 3, Fall 2005. Kaufman’s argument is 
qualified as only applying to the UN Security Council.  
14 Elshtain (2004), op. cit., p. 169; Buchanan (2006), op. cit.; & Fernando Téson, “Ending Tyranny in 
Iraq,” Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 19, Number 2, 2005. Although I include Téson here among 
the revisionists, it is worth noting that he also argues in Humanitarian Intervention, 3rd ed., (Ardsley, 
N.Y.: Transnational, 2005) that the war in Iraq was legal.  
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necessary or proportional in the absence of a just cause.15 It is conventionally 
understood that the presence of a just cause for war is a necessary condition, but not 
a sufficient condition, for justifying recourse to arms.16 As a logical revision of this 
conventional approach, Fernando Téson embraces an alternative hermeneutic 
understanding of JWT principles as considerations that “incline” judgment, rather 
than as strict necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. But according to both the 
analytic and the hermeneutic approach, the principle of just cause imposes a basic 
constraint (or constraining pressure) on what kinds of aims may be pursued by 
means of the resort to arms. To have just cause is to have an ethically legitimate aim 
of a kind that can sometimes be justifiably pursued by means of war – but not 
always. One might have a just cause that is nevertheless too trivial to justify war. 
Since having a just cause is “not a matter of scale,” whether a proposed war is a just 
means of pursuing a particular just cause is also a question of discrimination, 
necessity and proportionality.17 But these questions must be framed in relation to 
specific just causes.  
     A just war must also be discriminating at the outset. This consideration imposes 
further important constraints upon estimations of necessity and proportionality. If 
one has just cause C against X, but not against Y, then war against Y can neither be 
necessary nor proportional. Thus, there is arguably a second jus ad bellum principle 
of discrimination. This may seem surprising to those who are familiar with the 
recent literature. Recently promulgated lists of conventional JWT principles 
typically mention jus ad bellum principles of necessity (or last resort) and 
proportionality, but no jus ad bellum principle of discrimination. The importance of 
discriminating between ethically legitimate and illegitimate enemies/targets is 
typically mentioned only as a jus in bello consideration. Why? The distinction 
between jus ad bellum and jus in bello principles of JWT is commonly understood 
to coincide with the distinction between, on the one hand, the general “theater” level 
of national war planning and, on the other hand, the consequent and subsequent 
                                                
15 McMahan (2005a), op. cit., p. 5-6; David Mellow, “Counterfactuals and the Proportionality Criterion,” 
Ethics and International Affairs, Volume xx, number xx, 2006, pp. 239-254. McMahan argues, further, 
for the unconventional claim that no jus in bello standards of just warfare can be satisfied in the absence 
of just cause. Since I am focusing on jus ad bellum considerations alone, I won’t address this claim here.  
16 Téson (2005), op. cit., p. 3; Orend (2006), op. cit., p. 32.  
17 McMahan (2005a), op. cit. Note that if just causes are necessary but non-sufficient conditions for war, 
then it is a mistake to distinguish between “sufficient” and “contributing” just causes, as McMahan and 
Robert McKim did in “The Just War and the Gulf War,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 23, 
1993, pp. 512–13. Although McMahan is in many ways a revisionist, his mature view of just causes as 
necessary but non-sufficient conditions for war does not appear to be inconsistent with conventional 
JWT. Perhaps his most striking revision, which harkens back to Grotius, is his insistence upon 
distinguishing between guilty and innocent in all phases of JWT.  
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contexts of military maneuver that are proper to specific brigades and individual 
soldiers.18 Why should we follow recent standard enumerations of JWT principles in 
supposing that theater level war planners need not distinguish between ethically 
legitimate and illegitimate enemies/targets?  
     Perhaps the reason for this standard omission is the assumption that the principle 
of just cause essentially or necessarily involves a triadic relation: "Agent A has just 
cause C against legitimate enemy/target X." If the principle of just cause is 
necessarily triadic – if, in other words, there is a conceptual connection between 
having a just cause and delimiting the range of legitimate enemies/targets against 
whom one has it – then the issue of discrimination is always implicit in the principle 
of just cause, and there is no need to introduce discrimination as a separate jus ad 
bellum principle. Alternatively, if just cause is not necessarily triadic – if, as I have 
suggested, just cause is simply a matter of having an ethically justifiable aim which 
may or may not be sufficient grounds for war against anyone – then issues of 
discrimination (between guilty and innocent, responsible and non-responsible, 
combatant and non-combatant) may arise independently of the question of just 
cause at the jus ad bellum phase of ethical deliberation about warfare. To 
complicate matters, the analytic question about the grammar of just cause can only 
be answered in relation to specific just causes, and these carry different implications 
for jus ad bellum identification of legitimate enemies/targets. A punitive just cause 
is necessarily triadic. The same is not the case, however, for the most basic 
conventional just cause of self-defense. That identifying legitimate enemies/targets 
is analytically distinct from having just cause for armed self-defense is revealed in 
the traditional issue that Grotius raises immediately after enumerating just causes 
(and long before his systematic treatment of jus in bello discrimination). As a 
qualifying addendum to the just cause of self-defense, he raises the question of 
whether, in defending oneself, one is permitted to kill someone who is an innocent 
obstacle to the achievement of one’s end.19 A timelier and more difficult question of 
jus ad bellum discrimination is the question of whether it is ethically justifiable for 
purposes of self-defense against terrorism to treat foreign states that harbor terrorists 
as enemies on par with the terrorists themselves. If it makes sense to raise these 
questions at the theater level of war planning, then it makes sense to speak of 
                                                
18 Thomas Hurka, “Proportionality in the Morality of War,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Volume 33, 
Number 1, 2005, p. 35; McMahan (2005a), op. cit., p. 6; & Orend (2006), op. cit., p. 31-2.  
19 Grotius, op. cit., II.i.4. I am indebted to Cecile Fabre for prompting me to expand upon, and to supply 
scholarly warrant for the idea that issues of discrimination may arise at the jus ad bellum phase of 
military deliberations.  
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discrimination as a jus ad bellum principle analytically distinct from the principle of 
just cause.  
     Issues of discrimination are epistemically loaded in every context of military 
decision-making, but the burden of proof is especially weighty in jus ad bellum 
contexts in which the available time for deliberation is plentiful. The identification 
of legitimate enemies/targets calls for painstaking exactitude because mistakes on 
this point are morally momentous. The conventional right to defend oneself in 
response to aggression ought to be discriminating in the sense that it is a right to 
defend oneself against the aggressor(s). To wage war against any others is to 
become an aggressor oneself. The judgment that a proposed war effort will place 
one on the just side of the divide between aggressor and defender should therefore 
be the conclusion of careful ethico-historical analysis and argument. Although it 
seems reasonable to suppose that similar considerations of jus ad bellum 
discrimination may be applied to other, revisionist just causes, there may be 
exceptions. If the threats to a vulnerable population are shifting, haphazard or 
merely potential, then it may make sense to exempt armed humanitarian 
intervention from a strict application of the jus ad bellum principle of 
discrimination. In contrast, it is difficult to imagine conditions under which a similar 
exemption could reasonably be allowed for a putatively just war of humanitarian 
regime change. Such a war should target only those elements within a rogue 
government that are clearly responsible for making it corrupt and oppressive. A 
similar, and perhaps even a greater degree of exactitude in discrimination should 
apply to putatively just preventive counter-terrorism warfare. If this type of warfare 
may legitimately target rogue states, it would need to be clearly established and well 
known in advance of a preventive resort to arms that the regimes in question have 
both the capacity and the active determination to arm terrorists with WMD. In the 
post-9/11 JWT literature, there has been perhaps too little discussion of jus ad 
bellum issues of discrimination (even as implicit issues of just cause), and little 
discussion of what exactly the epistemic standards for these issues should be. For 
example, is proof beyond a reasonable doubt of direct material support of terrorism 
necessary for just preventive war against a rogue regime? Or is it enough that a 
preponderance of the evidence should suggest such support? Or does this novel 
modality of warfare require for its justification the construction of a novel standard 
of evidence?  
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     A just war, conventionally understood, must also be necessary as a last resort in 
the sense that no other available means will suffice for the successful achievement 
of effective self-defense. This standard may also be applied to other revisionist just 
causes. Accordingly, taking up arms is necessary as a last resort when no other 
available means short of war will suffice to prevent non-imminent but massively 
destructive attacks, to protect others from grave harms, or to reform rogue regimes. 
Warfare becomes necessary as a last resort when no other available means are 
sufficient to the task of successfully prosecuting a just aim or cause.20 This 
conventional way of understanding the principle of last resort as a doctrine of 
military necessity does not require that all other available means of attempting to 
achieve a just cause must actually be pursued and exhausted. Such a standard would 
be impossible to satisfy; for, as Michael Walzer notes, “There is always something 
more to do: another diplomatic note, another UN resolution, another meeting.”21 
The conventional understanding of last resort also makes this principle independent 
of estimations of proportionality. It does not merely stipulate that warfare, in order 
to count as a necessary last resort, must be marginally more economical (in terms of 
relevant costs and benefits) than alternative non-military means of achieving the 
same end. Rather, a just war must be the only available means of succeeding in the 
achievement of a discriminating just cause or aim. Since the nature of an aim 
determines what is necessary for its achievement, a discriminating just cause will 
largely determine the conditions for satisfying the principle of last resort. For 
example, the resort to arms is far more likely to be necessary for purposes of self-
defense against ongoing aggression than, say, for purposes of preventive counter-
terrorism or humanitarian regime change. Ongoing military aggression has rarely 
been repulsed by means short of war. But there are many effective non-military 
means of preventing terrorist attacks and promoting democracy abroad.  
     According to Thomas Hurka’s revisionist approach to JWT, the principle of last 
resort does not impose a strict standard that war should be the “only available 
sufficient means” of achieving a just cause. Instead, on his account, the principle of 
last resort is reducible to the principle of proportionality.22 War becomes rationally 
necessary, on his approach, if it is the optimal course of action from the standpoint 
of a relevant cost-benefit analysis. In other words, if warfare is the most 
                                                
20 For the notion that the principle of last resort requires that war be a necessary means, see Richard Falk, 
The Great Terror War (Brooklyn, NY: Olive Branch Press, 2003); Neta C. Crawford, “The Slippery 
Slope to Preventive War,” Ethics and International Affairs, Volume 17, Number 1, 2003, p. 31.  
21 Walzer (2000), op. cit., p. xiv. 
22 Hurka (2005), op. cit., pp. 37-38. 
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proportional means of effectively achieving a just cause, among a range of 
alternatives including those short of war, then the military option simply is the last 
resort. The rationally necessary means of pursuing a just cause is the most 
proportional means available. This revisionist way of reducing the principle of last 
resort to the principle of proportionality is more permissive than the conventional 
approach because it does not require that warfare be the only sufficient means 
available, but only requires that warfare be marginally more effective than the non-
military alternatives.  
     According to conventional approaches to JWT, the military means of prosecuting 
a just cause must not only be the only effective option available, but it must also be 
proportional (a) in the sense that the benefits to be achieved by war must outweigh 
the harms that it inflicts,23 (b) in the sense that the use of arms should not be 
“excessive,”24 or (c) in the sense that “a minimum of force” should be employed.25 
The less harmful the occasion for just cause – e.g., the less harmful the ongoing 
aggression, non-imminent threat, humanitarian crisis, or rogue regime – the more 
stringent the proportionality requirement becomes.26 Estimations of proportionality 
also become more or less stringent depending upon the kinds of just cause under 
consideration. On the first, most common construction (a), the principle of 
proportionality requires a cost-benefit analysis, albeit one that is embedded within a 
principled, rights-based JWT. The rights-based qualification of cost-benefit analysis 
places certain limitations on the kinds of costs and benefits that can count towards 
the estimation of the proportionality of a just war. Hurka gives a clear illustration of 
how the principle of just cause imposes such a restriction. Imagine a nation that is 
mired in an economic recession and has just cause for warfare. It has good reason to 
believe that waging this war will help to alleviate its economic woes. Even so, the 
economic benefits of the war “surely cannot count toward its proportionality,” 
because profiteering is not a just cause for war.27 Other things being equal, a 
profitable war may be better, more desirable than an unprofitable war; but the 
                                                
23 Jaggar, “What is Terrorism, Why is it Wrong, and Could It Ever Be Morally Permissible?” Journal of 
Social Philosophy 36, No. 2, Summer 2005, p. 214; David Mellow, “Iraq: A Morally Justified Resort to 
War,” Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2006(b), p. 303; Whitley Kaufman, “What’s 
Wrong With Preventive War? The Moral and Legal Basis of the Preventive Use of Force,” Ethics & 
International Affairs, Volume 19, Number 3, Fall 2005, p. 24; & Buchanan (2006), op. cit., p. 27.  
24 Michael L. Gross, “Assassination and Targeted Killing: Law Enforcement, Execution or Self-
Defense?,” Journal of Applied Philosophy, volume 23, number 3, 2006, p. 325. 
25 Patterson (2005), op. cit., p. 119. 
26 Jeff McMahan, “The Basis of Moral Liability to Defensive Killing,” Philosophical Issues, Volume 14: 
Normativity, 2005(b), p. 401.  
27 Hurka (2005), pp. 40-41.  
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benefits of profiteering do not make a war more just. Such economic benefits are 
therefore ethically irrelevant from the standpoint of JWT. For the conventionalist, 
only increased security from the harms of aggression can count in favor of the 
proportionality of war. Hence, the harms that would likely result from alternative 
responses – e.g., appeasement, surrender, resistance short of war, etc. – must 
outweigh the harms that would likely result from the resort to armed self-defense.  
     Some revisionist just war theorists allow that additional “contributing” just 
causes may increase the level of justifiable harm that satisfies the requirement of 
proportionality in wars fought primarily for the cause of self-defense against 
aggression.28 Accordingly, a hybrid defensive-humanitarian war would be 
proportional if and only if the harms likely to result from measures short of war 
would exceed the harms likely to result from defensive war less any net harms 
associated with humanitarian efforts. In this way, the availability of additional 
revisionist just causes, over and above the conventional just cause of self-defense, 
may “contribute to a war’s proportionality” by increasing the amount of harm that 
may count as proportional.29  
 
2. 9/11 & Conventional Jus ad Bellum  
With these broad principles and issues in mind, let us now revisit 9/11 and its 
aftermath. I shall help myself, without detailed supporting argument, to the premise 
that al-Qaeda’s attacks were unjust. If, contrary to this assumption, al-Qaeda’s 
attacks were ethically justifiable, then it would follow, from a conventional JWT 
precept that can be traced back at least as far as the work of Hugo Grotius, that the 
U.S. could have no just cause in response to 9/11. According to this precept, “with 
regard to the act itself, a war cannot be just on both sides, any more than a lawsuit 
can be.”30 At most, Grotius allows that there are exceptional instances (he mentions 
the Peloponnesian war) in which both sides to a conflict may be said to fight 
permissibly, owing to an unavoidable and “good faith” ignorance of where the just 
cause lies. In such cases, enemies may mutually declare a “formal” or “legal” war 
under the law of nations.31 In contrast, according to some revisionist versions of 
JWT warfare can easily be just on both sides, if an initially just war is waged by 
                                                
28 Hurka (2005), pp. 41-43.  
29 Hurka (2005), p. 42.  
30 Hugo Grotius, The Laws of War and Peace, II.xxiii.13, Francis W. Kelsey trans., Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1925.   
31 Grotius, op. cit., III.iii.7. 
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unjust means.32 On this alternative, even in the conduct of a war prosecuted for a 
just cause, violations of jus in bello standards may suffice to give just cause to the 
other side. Accordingly, even if al-Qaeda did have a discriminating just cause for 
proportional war against the U.S., the jus in bello indiscriminate nature of the 9/11 
attacks may still have sufficed for a revisionist claim of just cause for U.S. war 
efforts in response. Assuming that al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks lacked jus ad bellum 
justification, however, the question of just cause becomes a one-sided issue. 
     There were, of course, no “ongoing” terrorist attacks after 9/11; but there was 
good reason to suppose that there would be ongoing al-Qaeda efforts to orchestrate 
further attacks. So, the U.S. was often said to have faced the kind of aggression that 
qualifies as a conventional just cause for self-defensive war against al-Qaeda. On 
this point, it matters little that al-Qaeda is not a member of the world society of 
sovereign states. As Brian Orend rightly notes, “there is nothing, in just war theory 
or international law, which says that aggression can only be committed by states.”33 
Supposing the U.S. had just cause to defend itself with the force of arms after 9/11, 
it nevertheless remains an open question of jus ad bellum discrimination whether it 
had just cause against any entity other than al-Qaeda. In particular, did the U.S. 
have just cause to defend itself against any foreign states? It was surely conceivable 
that U.S.-led counter-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan could have targeted al-Qaeda 
elements without also endeavoring to topple the Taliban government. On this 
alternative, Taliban forces might have been left alone so long as they did not 
attempt directly and forcibly to obstruct military operations against al-Qaeda. Yet, 
there was little or no discussion of this possibility in the weeks after 9/11 in the U.S. 
public sphere. Instead, the cause of counter-terrorism was immediately shoehorned 
into the prevailing Westphalian framework of interstate warfare. Were there 
sufficient grounds for this move?  
     From the standpoint of conventional JWT, interstate warfare in response to a 
sub-state aggressor is an awkward fit. One prominent way of attempting to 
assimilate 9/11 into a conventional interstate framework has been to claim that the 
al-Qaeda attacks represented a new form of terrorism, or “mega-terrorism,” which 
resembled Pearl Harbor more than it resembled previous acts of sub-state terrorist 
                                                
32 McMahan (2005a), op. cit., p. 1; Orend (2006), op. cit., p. 43.  
33 Orend (2006), op. cit., p. 71.  
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organizations.34 In this way, 9/11 was construed as an attack on the order of 
conventional international aggression. The key analogy is open to dispute, however. 
Unlike Pearl Harbor (and especially unlike the Pearl Harbor of popular memory) 
9/11 did not come as a surprise attack without precedent or prior declaration.35 The 
previous 1993 car bombing of the World Trade Center, the 1998 fatwa of the World 
Islamic Front, the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, and the 2000 
bombing of the USS Cole made it immediately and painfully clear that 9/11 was not 
the start of a new war, but the continuation of an old one. From the standpoint of 
conventional JWT, 9/11 is more accurately described as a wildly successful but 
indiscriminate transnational attack in an ongoing sub-state Islamist insurgency 
against U.S. military predominance and political influence abroad. So, if the U.S. 
had just cause for war with al-Qaeda, it had it at least since 1993.36 In 1998 it acted 
accordingly in conducting simultaneously one intuitively proportional bombing raid 
against known al-Qaeda targets in Afghanistan, and one intuitively disproportionate 
and indiscriminate missile strike on a Sudanese pharmaceutical factory that was 
dimly and erroneously suspected of al-Qaeda affiliation.37 Viewed in this context, 
9/11 looks nothing like Pearl Harbor. It was part of an ongoing transnational 
conflict.  
     Conventionally construed, 9/11 therefore did not present a jus ad bellum moment 
at all. It was a jus in bello moment preceded by others similar in kind. When 
compared with previous attacks, there was nothing novel about the location, nor 
anything novel about the kind of harm inflicted. Al-Qaeda had already launched an 
attack on U.S. soil, and it had already killed indiscriminately abroad. So, from the 
standpoint of conventional JWT, 9/11 did not create a new just cause for war. It 
may have increased by a substantial increment the amount of force required for a 
proportional defensive response; for al-Qaeda had not previously killed 
indiscriminately on U.S. soil, nor did any of its prior acts inflict harm on such a 
                                                
34 Richard Falk, The Great Terror War (Brooklyn, NY: Olive Branch Press, 2003), p. 1; & Orend (2006), 
op. cit., pp. 1 & 71. To his credit, Falk tells me that he no longer thinks this claim is warranted, and he 
would substantially revise The Great Terror War if he were inclined to rewrite it.  
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Sudanese medicines. See Michael Barletta, “Chemical Weapons in the Sudan: Allegations and 
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massive scale. Understood in this way, 9/11 need not have changed the terms of the 
war in a way that left conventional JWT behind. To the conventionalist, the 
indiscriminate nature of the 9/11 attacks makes them war crimes, which are 
presumptive occasions for international law enforcement against sub-state actors by 
means short of war. But in the absence of law enforcement cooperation from abroad 
(e.g., from the Taliban or from Pakistan), if the U.S. had just cause to employ 
proportional instruments of armed self-defense against al-Qaeda in 1998, then it still 
had the same right in the fall of 2001. The only difference would be that after 9/11, 
the U.S. would also have new grounds for escalating the kind of “targeted” 
(discriminating) attacks that it made against Afghani al-Qaeda facilities in 1998. 
9/11 clearly raised the threshold of proportionality as al-Qaeda proved itself to be a 
more dangerous enemy than previously imagined. A conventionally justifiable 
military response would have involved targeted transnational attacks that would 
have crossed borders to reach responsible or affiliated sub-state actors; but in the 
absence of direct hostilities from the Taliban such attacks could not justifiably 
become interstate attacks between sovereign entities. From the standpoint of 
conventional JWT, it is inherently indiscriminate to commence interstate warfare as 
a means of combating the war crimes of sub-state actors. 
     In the months prior to 9/11 the Bush administration had already departed from 
the precedent set by the Clinton administration by declining to launch targeted 
retaliatory strikes in response to the bombing of the USS Cole. According to 
Condoleeza Rice, the reason for this change in strategy was that President Bush was 
“tired of swatting flies” (despite never having tried it).  
There is a question of whether or not you respond in a tactical 
sense or whether you respond in a strategic sense, whether or not 
you decide that you are going to respond to every attack with 
minimal use of military force . . . on a kind of tit-for-tat basis . . . 
[or] . . . not doing this tit for tat, doing this on a time of our 
choosing.38  
 
The line that Rice draws between tactical and strategic response is significant. It 
distinguishes the maneuvers of specific brigades and individual soldiers from the 
“theater” level of national war planning. As explained above, in conventional JWT, 
                                                
38 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, “Testimony of National Security 
Advisor, Condoleezza Rice,” Thursday, April 8, 2004. My emphasis. Downloadable as of 6/6/07 from 
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this division of military labor corresponds to the distinction between jus in bello and 
jus ad bellum principles.39 Thus, the Bush administration’s frustration with 
“minimal” (proportional in the third (3) sense above) in bello tactics was expressed 
in the form of a desire to wait for a new jus ad bellum moment – “a time of our 
choosing” – when the scope of just cause and the grand strategy of the conflict 
could be redefined. Accordingly, after 9/11 the Bush administration immediately 
claimed to have just cause for a new and more expansive interstate war, despite the 
strangeness of finding it in a jus in bello violation. 
 
3. 9/11 & Revisionist Jus ad Bellum  
The dominant alternative and revisionist way of finding just cause for interstate 
warfare in the 9/11 attacks hinges largely upon the Shultz Doctrine. This doctrine 
holds that if states have just cause for armed self-defense against sub-state terrorist 
organizations, then they also have just cause to use such arms against “states that 
support, train, and harbor terrorists.”40 In recent years, revisionist Anglo-American 
just war theorists have tended to embrace this doctrine very quickly and uncritically. 
For instance, in a first rate treatment of JWT that is sure to become a classroom 
standard, Orend asserts the Shultz Doctrine without any critical discussion of 
specific reasons for or against it.41 Similarly, Hurka invokes the doctrine as if it 
were self-evident.42 Shultz, Orend and Hurka may be right, of course. Their position 
has been supported over the course of the last twenty years by the United States, 
Israel, the United Kingdom and Australia. But there is clearly room for debate here, 
given that the doctrine is not an accepted element of international law, and given 
that it has been rejected by most other nations of the world, including such 
European powers as Spain, Germany and France. If strong norms of state 
sovereignty are the best protections that weak states have against the dominance of 
strong states, then in many quarters of the globe the Shultz Doctrine may reasonably 
appear to be a menacing innovation of imperial law.43 From a cosmopolitan 
perspective, it may seem to contain an overly lax interpretation of the jus ad bellum 
principle of discrimination. And it may seem designed to benefit those in positions 
of military power in greater proportion than their demonstrable contribution to the 
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40 U.S. Secretary of State, George P. Shultz, “Address to the National Defense University, Washington, 
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comprehensive, and up-to-date introduction to JWT currently available on the textbook market.  
42 Hurka (2005), p. 42. 
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global common good. In the absence of an international consensus establishing a 
meaningful cosmopolitan definition of “terrorism,” terrorists tend to be in the eye of 
the beholder. Under such conditions, many cautious thinkers worry that it may be 
too easy for powerful states to invoke the Shultz Doctrine as a rationale for 
illegitimate aggression as well as legitimate self-defense.  
     When we compare the Shultz Doctrine to conventional principles of JWT that 
are rooted in “the domestic analogy,”44 it becomes apparent that it represents a 
loosening of the jus ad bellum principle of discrimination in a way that substantially 
erodes the degree of restraint that it has traditionally placed upon recourse to arms. 
In terms of responsibility for the harms of war, there is a significant difference 
between attacking another state and giving safe harbor to sub-state organizations 
that directly carry out such attacks.45 We do not treat the families and friends of 
murderers as if they were murderers themselves.46 And even if the support that they 
give rises to the level of aiding and abetting in the commission of the murder, we do 
not treat them as accessories to murder with the same severity reserved for the 
murderer proper. It would therefore be exceedingly difficult to defend the Shultz 
Doctrine by analogy with domestic norms of liability to suffer lethal measures of 
force. Since drawing some such domestic analogy has been the dominant 
conventional method of argument among just war theorists, revisionists who find 
the Shultz Doctrine intuitively attractive will need to show alternative grounds for 
justifying the discrepancy between domestic and international norms of responsible 
agency and liability to lethal attack. This element of revisionist JWT calls for 
serious critical thinking about the threshold of liability that might make some forms 
and degrees of direct state sponsorship of sub-state terrorism tantamount to 
terrorism itself. Successful defense of this revisionist approach to jus ad bellum 
discrimination also calls for the construction of a reasonably cosmopolitan 
conception of ‘terrorism’ capable of addressing worries about self-serving 
hegemonic bias (see section 4 below).  
     The Bush Doctrine incorporates and further elaborates the Shultz doctrine. It 
conceives of sub-state terrorist organizations as the “clients” of an alliance or “axis” 
of rogue states that wish to disrupt a U.S.-dominated global political order.47 These 
states personify evil and are activated by settled dispositions of hostility inasmuch 
                                                
44 Walzer (2000), op. cit., pp. 58-63.  
45 Neta C. Crawford (2003), op. cit., p. 31.  
46 I am indebted to Kirstie McClure for bringing home the relevance of this point.  
47 White House (2002), op. cit.  
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as they “reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for 
which it stands.”48 Here the notion of American exceptionalism is invoked to 
identify the enemies of the U.S. as the enemies of humanity. If the U.S. is the 
champion of “basic human values,” then its enemies must be the enemies of 
everyone, everywhere. For a hegemon that is truly exceptional in its degree of 
ethical virtue, there is no strategic contradiction in embracing unilateralist means of 
pursuing the putatively multi-lateral aims of global counter-terrorism. Terrorism 
may be in the eye of the beholder, but according to supporters of Bush Doctrine 
exceptionalism U.S. perceptions are ethically authoritative for the world 
community.49 The most obvious problem with this position, which critics of U.S. 
policies have been eager to point out, is that the mixed record of history does not 
adequately support the U.S. claim to exceptional virtue.50  
     The Bush Doctrine goes well beyond the Shultz Doctrine by advancing the 
notion that global terrorism is sponsored by a conspiracy of rogue states known as 
the “Axis of Evil.”51 The “9/11 Commission Report” found no evidence that the al-
Qaeda attacks were funded by any foreign state.52 But sponsorship comes in many 
forms. Although al-Qaeda members were not exactly the “irregular troops”53 of the 
Taliban, they were part of a well-established cooperative alliance. Like Pakistan, al-
Qaeda gave financial, technological and professional support to the Taliban’s efforts 
to resist the Tajik and Uzbek insurgency of the Northern Alliance from 1996 to 
2001. In return, the Taliban gave safe haven to al-Qaeda and rebuked U.S. requests 
for cooperation in international law enforcement. If, contrary to the objections 
raised above, the Shultz Doctrine is defensible, then the U.S. had compelling 
grounds for viewing the 9/11 attacks as expanding a previously existing just cause 
to include a discriminating just cause for interstate war against the Taliban. Beyond 
Afghanistan, the idea that 9/11 was an act of a multi-state-sponsored terrorist 
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conspiracy has been kept alive by the perception of common causes and connections 
between al-Qaeda and other militant Islamist groups, some of which were known or 
suspected recipients of direct support from Iraq, Iran and Syria. The conspiracy 
theory implicit in the Bush Doctrine’s claim that these states belong to an Axis of 
Evil is crucial for imagining that 9/11 provided just cause for an interstate GWOT 
beyond Afghanistan. Yet, the underlying imputation of conspiracy between these 
states might be even more dubious than the oft-derided moral Manicheanism of the 
Axis of Evil idea. Only a pan-Arab nationalism oddly allied with Persian 
nationalism could overcome the deep sectarian divisions that exist between al-
Qaeda, Hizbollah, Hamas, etc.; and only a pan-Islamic alliance could overcome 
existing tensions between Syria, Iraq, Iran, etc. Even supposing that each of these 
entities harbors settled malice towards the U.S. and its allies in the GWOT, the 
divisions between them make them somewhat unlikely (though not impossible) co-
conspirators. How much evidence of menacing cooperation between these states is 
sufficient to satisfy the jus ad bellum principle of discrimination and widen just 
cause for armed self-defense such that the entire Axis of Evil should become a 
legitimate enemy/target?  
     The Bush Doctrine also adds to the Shultz Doctrine a highly controversial right 
of preventive war that substantially lowers the standard for claiming just cause in 
the first place. The incompatibility of this element of the Bush Doctrine with the 
principles of conventional just war theory has been duly noted in the critical 
literature. The most prevalent form of counter-argument maintains that, according to 
conventional standards, unilateral preventive military operations are in principle 
unjust.54 A second form of objection stresses that a defensible right of preventive 
warfare would have to satisfy the highest standards of evidence in order to avoid the 
pitfalls of the slippery slope that leads from just prevention to anarchical aggression 
and numerous fruitless wars.55 And a third, empirically contingent objection holds 
that were wars of preventive self-defense ever justifiable in principle, it would have 
to be under conditions that include the existence of an effective and morally reliable 
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set of international institutional safeguards imposing penalties for spurious 
campaigns.56 Given the unconventional permissiveness of a preventive just cause, it 
would seem reasonable to suppose that, as a counterpoise to the threat of licentious 
militarism, the corresponding evidentiary standard of discrimination should be 
unconventionally high. For instance, it might seem reasonable to suppose that a 
discriminating just cause for fighting preventive wars on every front of the Axis of 
Evil would have to rest on evidence that proves the combined foreign menace well 
beyond any reasonable doubt.     
     To many minds, even if the members of the Axis of Evil are not co-conspirators, 
the prospect that any one of these states might alone make WMD available to al-
Qaeda or some similar anti-American or anti-Western terrorist group raises the 
stakes well above what would make an alternative, international law enforcement 
approach seem like a good gamble. The potential transfer of such weapons threatens 
noncombatant immunity and makes estimations of the imminence of attacks 
radically uncertain.57 The U.S. has a tremendous capacity for enacting strategies of 
military deterrence. Yet, terrorist martyrs are not readily deterred. It therefore makes 
better strategic sense to focus on deterring leaders of states that might otherwise act 
on their sympathies for, or common interests with, Islamist terrorist organizations. 
Again, whether this approach is also ethically justifiable depends in part upon 
whether a reasonably revised construction of the jus ad bellum principle of 
discrimination can incorporate a standard of liability to attack that is more 
permissive than domestic norms. Revisionist just war theorists need to give greater 
attention to this standard than has so far been given. We do not ordinarily hold arms 
merchants liable for crimes committed with the weaponry that they make available 
on an open market. So, why should states be liable to preventive attacks on grounds 
that they are likely (how likely?) to enter into similar transactions?  
     Even granting that, as the Bush Doctrine maintains, the U.S. had just cause for 
preventive self-defense against al-Qaeda and its supporters, it remains an open 
question whether warfare was a necessary and proportional means of prosecuting 
this cause. The necessity and proportionality of the wars that ensued after 9/11 
depend largely upon whether less bellicose alternatives would have sufficed (on a 
conventional construction), or would have sufficed as efficiently (on Hurka’s 
revisionist construction) to contend with the al-Qaeda threat. It is therefore 
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important for theorists of a just GWOT to consider the strategic literature. 
Frequently noted in the critical literature on the Bush Doctrine’s approach to global 
counter-terrorism is the evident strategic contradiction of embracing unilateralist 
means of promoting the putatively multilateral benefits of counter-terrorism.58 
Accordingly, many prominent critics of post-9/11 U.S. security strategy have called 
for a shift towards genuine or increased multilateralism,59 while others have 
recommended the attenuated force of international “balancing”60 or greater 
investment in “soft power” strategies.61 Surprisingly, the critical literature has less 
frequently noted that, as Richard Falk recently put it, the “the great unlearned lesson 
of 9/11” is that conventional military superiority is a poor guarantor of human 
security in an age of sub-state transnational terrorism.62 It is worth reminding 
ourselves that the 9/11 attacks were carried out with weapons no more menacing 
than box-cutters. This fact, far more than the strategic contradiction inherent in a 
unilateral GWOT, provides a powerful reason for thinking that effective counter-
terrorism should be implemented primarily, if not entirely, through legal methods of 
global governance.  
     If the Shultz doctrine alone did not justify expanding the ongoing war against al-
Qaeda to include war against the Taliban, or war against Iraq, then putatively 
humanitarian aims were sufficient, for some just war theorists, to fill the normative 
gap.63 The "responsibility to protect" and the corresponding "right of humanitarian 
intervention" are controversial innovations of emergent public international law and 
revisionist just war theory. The 2001 Report of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty was designed to forge the basis for a new 
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international legal consensus on the question of when states, unilaterally or 
multilaterally, may justifiably take military action against another state for the 
purpose of protecting its people.64 The potentially consensus-building impact of this 
report was eclipsed, however, by the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the ensuing debate 
over the justifiability of a GWOT.65 The prospect for international consensus on 
humanitarian military intervention is now no better than it was in 1994 when the 
world community stood idly by as genocide unfolded in Rwanda. And the UN 
Security Council has offered few signs of a willingness to embrace the terms of the 
proposed consensus as the basis for innovation in public international law. Yet, 
despite this impasse in the emergence of international legal consensus, the foreign 
policy establishment of the U.S. executive embraced and promulgated the idea of 
humanitarian military intervention with unprecedented vigor after 9/11. Although 
the Bush Doctrine’s GWOT is fundamentally a military policy of strategic national 
self-defense, it incorporates an explicitly compassionate and particularly aggressive 
commitment to humanitarian intervention as an auxiliary aim. Intervening 
compassionately on behalf of refugees and other victims of state repression is said 
to be an indirect way of fighting terrorism and the rogue regimes that sponsor it. 
“Our creed is to intervene early and intervene often, if that is what it takes to reduce 
suffering and thwart terror.”66 In this context, aims of humanitarian intervention are 
not treated as an independent just causes for the deployment of armed forces abroad. 
Instead, such aims are championed as secondary just causes that contribute to the 
overarching aim of preventive self-defense against terrorism. Accordingly, goals of 
humanitarian intervention have been invoked as contributing just causes for the 
otherwise defensive U.S.-led GWOT campaigns in both Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Indeed, given the absence of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that were 
invoked as the central grounds for a putatively just war of preventive self-defense in 
Iraq, the last ethical justification standing for continued military occupation of that 
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unfortunate nation is the humanitarian aim of providing security for a stable 
transition from dictatorship to sustainable democracy.67  
     The ethical aim of humanitarian-democratic regime change raises a hornets’ nest 
of issues. But I am only concerned here to address briefly certain neglected issues of 
JWT that arise from the way in which this radically revisionist just cause dovetails 
with claims of just self-defense against terrorism. Critical attention to the interplay 
of humanitarian and self-defensive just causes in general has tended to focus largely 
on the problem that Alan Buchanan calls “goal substitution,” wherein states wage 
non-humanitarian wars under cover of humanitarian concern.68 This is indeed an 
important problem. Yet, recurrent humanitarian pretexts for non-humanitarian wars 
soon wear thin and become unconvincing in the long run. So, there is a sense in 
which goal substitution cannot become a chronic problem. Rationally self-interested 
states can only gain advantage from duplicity in the long run by at least occasionally 
re-establishing credit.69 The result is selective and opportunistic humanitarianism. 
Hence the most common complaint about the principle of humanitarian intervention 
concerns its inconsistent application.70 Underlying this all-too-familiar pattern of 
ethical inconsistency is the deeper problem of political weakness of the will. States 
recognize the responsibility to protect, but fail consistently to act in accordance with 
this norm for lack of regular incentives of national self-interest. They tend to act 
responsibly when ulterior prudential motives are available, as was arguably the case 
with the NATO intervention in Kosovo. But when they ought to intervene even in 
the absence of compelling self-interested reasons, they tend to muster insufficient 
political will, as in the case of Rwanda. The first special problem that I wish to point 
up here is that a revisionist JWT that would consistently drag the principle of 
humanitarian intervention at the wheels of the counter-terrorism chariot can only 
exacerbate this troubling pattern of selective humanitarian action.  
     As a second note of caution, it is worth pointing out that the proliferation of 
contributing just causes in revisionist JWT may promote good faith acceptance of 
inflated standards of proportionality that are likely to be exceeded in practice. As we 
have seen, the principle of just cause constrains the grounds upon which states can 
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wage proportional warfare. Hence, the proliferation of contributing just causes may 
efface or substantially weaken this constraint. By combining preventive self-defense 
with the aim of humanitarian-democratic regime change, revisionist JWT inflates 
the amount of harm that can be said to satisfy the principle of proportionality. To be 
sure, this increase in permissible harms is in theory offset by the benefits of 
humanitarian regime change. But in practice, the benefits of regime-change warfare, 
inasmuch as they are deferred to an envisioned future state of democratic 
governance, will typically be radically uncertain. Hence, this form of warfare 
involves substantial risk of accepting too much predictable short-term harm for the 
sake of unpredictable future benefits. Moreover, since warfare tends to engender 
more warfare, standards of proportionality appropriate to the most modest of 
military campaigns are difficult to meet in practice.71 Accordingly, it should be even 
more difficult in practice to meet the inflated standards of proportionality implicit in 
the more ambitious aims of trying to further the cause of counter-terrorism through 
forced regime changes.  
     A third problem that is worth mentioning here is the problem of ethical cross-
purposes that arises from empirically insensitive or uncritical ways of combining 
the cause of humanitarian-democratic regime change with the cause of preventive 
counter-terrorism. There is a deep proportionality quandary lurking at the heart of 
the Bush Doctrine and like-minded JWT because the amount of harm that is 
proportional with respect to the aim of deterrent self-defense will, in many cases, 
exceed the amount of harm that is proportional with respect to the aim of 
humanitarian intervention. If the measure of force that is proportional for one’s 
humanitarian cause will not suffice for purposes of self-defense, and the measure of 
force required for deterrence will exceed what is proportional for humanitarian 
purposes, then one cannot possibly wage a proportional war with a view to 
achieving both causes. In such cases, one must choose whether to sacrifice the 
interests of others for the sake of self-defense or risk one’s own security in order to 
benefit others. In principle the Bush Doctrine clearly chooses the first option, but in 
practice it has impaled itself on the ethical contradiction of compassionate 
deterrence. This contradiction (not to be confused with the strategic contradiction of 
unilateral multilateralism) is perhaps best illustrated by the “Shock and Awe” phase 
of the invasion of Iraq. This highly public spectacle of mass destruction appeared to 
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be designed to serve the aim of deterrence as a means of preventive counter-
terrorism. It visibly demonstrated the overwhelming superiority of American 
military capabilities, and it made of Hussein’s Iraq an object lesson that other rogue 
regimes would not soon forget. Yet, this initial phase of the Iraq war was 
demonstrably indiscriminate in its effects, and it consequently undermined efforts to 
sell the idea that the invasion and occupation were designed to serve a genuinely 
humanitarian cause. Even supposing the cogency of each independent just cause in 
this case, the aim of just deterrence and the aim of just humanitarian intervention 
clearly operated at cross-purposes. One might attempt a priori to reconcile tensions 
between these aims by stipulating that the relationship between their independent 
measures of proportionality is to be treated as additive. But such an empirically 
insensitive approach is ethically unattractive. It would simultaneously blind us to 
the reality of conflicting aims and guarantee inflation in the level of violence that 
qualifies as proportional. For these reasons, just war theorists wishing to emphasize 
either ethical restraint, or reality-based military planning, or both, should consider 
the proposition that it might be better, other things being equal, for states to invoke 
and act upon simpler, unitary just causes for military action. In sum, insofar as JWT 
“is not pro-war,” insofar as it “seeks to minimize the reasons for which it is 
permissible to fight,”72 just war theorists should be exceedingly cautious about 
multiplying and aggregating just causes. 
 
4. Terrorism & Just Counter-terrorism Warfare 
Even if a just GWOT cannot reasonably be assimilated into to a conventional 
framework of interstate self-defense, it might nevertheless be conceived as a new 
justifiable form of ‘targeted’ transnational warfare waged only against those who 
are actively engaged in terrorism, or directly responsible for it. Central to the task of 
conceptualizing the aims and limits of a just GWOT, to be fought by means short of 
interstate war, is the issue of defining a form of political behavior that could both 
provide just cause and serve to identify legitimate targets for appropriately 
discriminating military operations. Setting aside the Shultz Doctrine’s contentious 
refusal to discriminate between sub-state terrorist organizations and states that 
support them, it is worth examining here the issue of whether it is practicable to 
conceive of “terrorists” as the primary enemy of a more targeted just GWOT.  
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     Much of the theoretical literature on terrorism sets out, first, to define the 
concept and, second, to determine if and when the corresponding form of activity 
may be justifiable.73 This is a strange approach to the subject given that there is far 
more agreement about the condemnatory connotation of ‘terrorism’ than there is 
about its empirical, sociological denotation. Perhaps, as David Rodin suggests, the 
essential task is, instead, to explain why terrorism is wrong.74  
     One well-known study, published eighteen years ago, canvassed 109 different 
social-scientific definitions of the term.75 More recently the scope and complexity of 
conceptual variance has dramatically increased, and the legal process of producing 
an international consensus definition has stalled. Yet, despite all the conceptual 
disagreement, remarkably few just war theorists have hesitated to condemn the 9/11 
attacks as terrorism. This remarkable convergence of judgment in the midst of 
conceptual contestation would appear to be due to the fact that nearly every 
candidate definition of ‘terrorism’ includes some reference to the indiscriminate 
killing of civilians, innocents or non-combatants as its primary effect. Perhaps al-
Quaeda’s particular wrongdoing was therefore not the crime of international 
aggression as conventionally conceived, but a violation of the jus in bello principle 
of discrimination according to just about any sensible construction of it. The official 
response was a declaration of counter-terrorism warfare. Thus, the central question 
that this declaration raises for contemporary revisionist JWT concerns whether it is 
morally appropriate and practicable to see the principle of discrimination not only as 
a side constraint in the conduct of war, but also as a jus ad bellum principle that 
both furnishes just cause and identifies legitimate targets of warfare. Jeff McMahan 
has cogently argued that unjust conduct in either just or unjust wars may provide the 
other side with just cause for necessary, proportional and discriminating war 
efforts.76 If this form of argument is supportable, then the 9/11 attacks might be 
construed as providing just cause for war against al-Qaeda independent of the 
question of whether these attacks constituted an act of international aggression.  
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     Some thinkers have recently raised important doubts, however, about how much 
work the traditional principle of discrimination can do in distinguishing between 
justifiable and unjustifiable warfare. Virginia Held, for example, has argued that, 
apart from “small children,” it is often unclear ”who the ‘innocent’ are as distinct 
from the ‘legitimate’ targets.”77 In her view, it is especially difficult to discriminate 
between legitimate and illegitimate targets when the enemy is a democratic polity 
“where citizens elect their leaders and are ultimately responsible for their 
government’s policies.”78 A related worry might be raised about citizens whose 
stock portfolios include investments in corporations that are directly involved in the 
business of warfare. Held challenges the principle of discrimination in order to 
show that conventional warfare may sometimes be morally worse than terrorism. 
Joseph Margolis similarly claims that no stable meaning can be ascribed to the 
traditional distinction between combatants and non-combatants. But he does so in 
arguing for a bolder conclusion. Without a workable principle of discrimination, we 
lack the conceptual resources for distinguishing between justifiable and 
unjustifiable warfare in the present context of world affairs. Just counter-terrorism 
warfare is strictly inconceivable. On this view, which may be called strict GWOT 
pacifism, there can be no such thing as a just GWOT.79 It follows from this 
conclusion, however, that there can also be no such thing as an unjust GWOT. If the 
Bush Doctrine is ethically condemnable, from this perspective, it can only be 
condemned for the cosmopolitan consequentialist reason that its global effects have 
been more harmful than beneficial to humanity, albeit with the odd qualification 
that no rights have thereby been violated.  
     Is the presumptive human right of non-combatant immunity so easily 
relinquished by virtue of a citizen’s participation in democratic decision-making, or 
by virtue of holding minor shares of stock in war-making private enterprises? Most 
just war theorists think not. One of the noteworthy points of broad agreement in 
recent JWT is Walzer’s stricture that the task of a theory of discrimination is not to 
identify conditions under which people merit the right not to be killed, but to 
identify conditions under which people may lose or forsake this weighty 
presumptive right.80 We should not look for legitimate targets wherever degrees of 
innocence and harmlessness fall short of those associated with small children. 
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Instead, we should start with paradigmatic instances of non-innocent combatants 
(NICs) and exercise extreme caution in expanding the range of legitimate counter-
terrorism targets beyond these agents. If “terrorism” is ordinarily understood to be a 
term of condemnation, then “counter-terrorism” is a term of praise that ought to be 
applied only to the most discriminating of military operations. Most just war 
theorists also agree to something more or less like the following: NICs are those 
persons who are directly engaged in or directly responsible for conducting the 
business of warfare.81 This includes not only those who do the fighting, but also 
those who make controlling decisions about when, where, how, and with whom the 
fighting will be conducted. Voters in democratic polities and minor shareholders in 
war-profiteering corporations per se do not appear to belong to this class of persons. 
Hence, it is at least in principle possible to define the ‘terrorist’ recursively as an 
indiscriminate and therefore unjust NIC.82  
     The concept of a NIC obviously applies to a diverse array of actors. In an age of 
civilian-embedded irregular forces and privatized military companies, a principled 
distinction between NICs and “civilians” cannot be upheld. NICs are not necessarily 
uniformed soldiers. Nor are terrorists necessarily irregulars associated with sub-state 
organizations. Accordingly, the recent theoretical literature has almost unanimously 
corrected for the popular prejudice (which is also official U.S. policy) that 
“terrorist” violence is always the business of sub-state actors.83  
     For the vast majority of just war theorists what sub-state terrorism and state 
terrorism have in common is the deliberate or intentional killing of innocent non-
combatants.84 According to this orthodox view, state terrorism is exemplified in 
such phenomena as the “disappearances” of Argentina’s Dirty War or Saddam 
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Hussein’s bombing of Kurdish Iraqis.85 Yet, the same epithet does not apply to the 
“collateral damage” of, for example, Shock and Awe. To some dissenting, 
revisionist just war theorists, however, the theoretical abstractions of the 
conventional doctrine of double effect seem unduly to discount or erode sympathy 
for the unintended but foreseeable innocent victims of conventional warfare.86 
Hence, the concern that collateral damage may in some instances and degrees 
qualify as terrorist violence is reflected in the recent theoretical literature on this 
topic. Rodin, for example, has cogently defended a conception of terrorism that 
encompasses indiscriminate killing of innocent non-combatants that is “deliberate, 
negligent, or reckless.”87 This construction allows for a more even-handed 
application of the condemnatory force of the “terrorist” label in contexts of 
asymmetric conflict. The worry is that restricting the condemnatory force of 
“terrorism” to instances of deliberate killing of innocent non-combatants unduly 
biases ethical judgment in favor of the powerful.88 In contrast, broadening the 
definition of terrorism to include a wider variety of subjective conditions 
accommodates the judgment of Rodin, Held, Ted Honderich, and many others who 
perceive that the unintended but predictable indiscriminate killing involved in 
conventional warfare is often at least as terroristic and condemnable as deliberate 
attacks on innocent non-combatants.89 Other things being equal, such as the number 
killed and the degree of their innocence and harmlessness, deliberate terrorism is 
surely worse than negligent or reckless terrorism. But the notion that only a direct 
intention to kill innocent non-combatants is condemnable as terrorism places too 
much weight on a subjective condition that is altogether too easy to conceal within 
complex bureaucracies of military decision-making. Yet, Rodin’s revisionist 
definition of terrorism also suggests that, “we should be extremely cautious about 
extending the rules of jus ad bellum so as to include terrorism as a just cause for 
war.”90 Throughout human history, conventional warfare has rarely served to 
minimize harms suffered by innocent non-combatants. Accordingly, many 
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dissenting just war theorists would agree with Tom Rockmore’s argument that, 
while a just GWOT may be conceivable in theory, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
have not been sufficiently limited to the targeting of unjust NICs to qualify as 
genuine counter-terrorism. Instead, this putative just cause has largely served as “a 
convenient pretext for American imperialist ambitions.”91 
     Let us suppose, however, that certain forms of targeted warfare against terrorist 
organizations such as al-Qaeda may be conducted in ways that are discriminating 
and proportional. If so, the prospects for successful militarized counter-terrorism 
must still be estimated in light of realities of the strategic landscape. To this end, it 
is important to understand the strategic aims of terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda. 
Many theoretical conceptions of terrorism see it as a form of political violence that 
is necessarily invested in the production of fear.92 How we understand this strategic 
investment is especially important for assessing the prospects of successful counter-
terrorism by conventional military means. Perhaps the greatest danger in 
succumbing to the terror of terrorism arises from the fact that, as Cicero and 
Grotius observed, fear is the basest of political motives and the principal cause of 
wrongful warfare.93 Significantly, this is also the central psychological insight 
behind Petr Kropotkin’s oft cited theory of terrorism as “propaganda of the deed.” 
As this theory would have it, the long-term aim of rational, counter-hegemonic 
terrorist violence is to embolden a sympathetic audience.94 Frightening an 
antipathetic audience is merely a short-term means to this end. After all, as Rodin 
emphasizes, panic episodes tend to be short-lived: “Shocking as the attacks may be, 
ordinary people generally get on with their lives.”95 Fear quickly spreads, but 
thereafter predictably subsides. Thus, the ultimate aim of strategically rational 
terrorism cannot be, as Samuel Scheffler puts it, to maximize “the numbers of 
people who identify with the victims,” and thereby “to maximize the spread of 
fear.”96 The rational, patient terrorist does not rely on the spread of fear as the 
                                                
91 Rockmore (2004), p. 386.  
92 Maryann Cusimano Love, “Globalization, Ethics, and the War on Terrorism,” Notre Dame Journal of 
Law, Ethics & Public Policy 16, No. 1 (2002); Jeremy Waldron, “Terrorism and the Uses of Terror,” The 
Journal of Ethics 8 (2004), pp. 5-35; Virginia Held (2004), op. cit., pp. 59-75; Jaggar (2005), op. cit., pp. 
202-217; Scheffler (2006), op. cit., pp. 1-17; & Orend (2006), op. cit., p. 69. 
93 Marcus Tullius Cicero, On Duties I.vii.24; Grotius, op. cit., II.i.5(1) & III.i.10(3).  
94 Robin Blackburn, “The Imperial Presidency, the War on Terrorism, and the Revolutions of 
Modernity,” Constellations, Volume 9, Number 1, 2002, p .3; Waldron, op. cit., p. 26.  
95 Rodin (2004), p. 761. Rodin also makes the important observation that the official aim of Japan’s Aum 
Shinrikyo cult is not to terrorize but to awaken the target population. Thus terrorists sometimes conceive 
of the violence that they inflict as a form of shock therapy for populations too inured to whatever 
perceived evil the terrorist purports to be fighting.  
96 Scheffler (2006), op. cit., p. 10. Despite my objection to this feature of Scheffler’s account of 
terrorism, I find his central thesis to be characteristically incisive: what is morally distinctive about 
 29 
primary means of inducing the desired coercion (or collapse) of the targeted social 
system. Instead, she anticipates that the enemy regime will panic and overreact, or 
see the panic of the populous as an opportunity for unprincipled, indiscriminate and 
“savage” (i.e. disproportionate) repressions.97 The strategically rational aim of 
deliberate, counter-hegemonic terrorism is to prompt the opposition to commit acts 
of negligent or reckless terrorism. Thus, the rational terrorist hopes to seduce the 
enemy regime into eroding its own claim to be engaged in genuine “counter-
terrorism.” As even the consummate realist Carl von Clausewitz recognized, “moral 
forces are amongst the most important subjects in war.”98 Thus, if the terrorism of 
9/11 belongs to a rational strategy of geopolitical real politik, it is perhaps best 
understood as designed, in the long run, to sap the moral forces that lend legitimacy 
to the dominant political order. The ultimate aim of its deliberately indiscriminate 
political violence is to maximize the numbers of people who identify, not with the 
victims of that violence, but with the victims of the (predictably greater?) reciprocal 
violence of the would-be hegemon. The rational insurgent’s hope is that this form of 
identification, coupled with the successes of counter-hegemonic violence, will 
ignite and embolden the settled resentments of the oppressed. Accordingly, insofar 
as we can understand deliberate terrorism as a rational political tactic designed to 
coerce or undermine stable forms of governance, we should be very wary of the 
rush to war, we should make cool-headed assessments of the most moderate and 
measured responses, and we should chastise fear-mongering politicians for aiding 
the enemy’s cause.  
     The greatest threat to the rational terrorist’s strategy is the dominant order’s 
capacity for effective and humane legal governance. Accordingly, in order to 
maintain the high moral ground, the leaders of a just GWOT should resort to 
conventional military operations only in exceedingly rare circumstances. The first 
and best circumstance is the all-too-rare one in which terrorists may be targeted in 
areas isolated from civilian populations, such as the Tora Bora bunker complex in 
Afghanistan. The employment of targeted or “named” military strikes also appears, 
at first blush, to be a justifiable tactic for a just GWOT. Accordingly, the airstrike 
that killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, has been lauded as 
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an exemplary instance of just military counter-terrorism.99 Yet, the efficacy of such 
strikes may be questionable on grounds that would-be martyrs are not readily 
deterred by the prospect of militarized extra-judicial execution. This concern has led 
some strategists and ethicists to worry that such “named killings” might actually 
fuel the cycle of reciprocal violence. Michael Gross, for example, has recently 
argued, on the basis of data from Israel’s experiments with targeted military 
killings, that there are at least substantial grounds for caution about the prospects for 
success in reducing terrorist violence by such means in contexts of intractable 
armed conflict.100 This “targeted” way of employing the instruments of conventional 
warfare is intuitively discriminating and, in some cases, proportional; but it remains 
an open question, at this point, whether it is likely to succeed in effectively 
combating the threat of deliberate counter-hegemonic terrorism.  
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